There are some literatures study the inequality in China. Khan et al. (1992) decompose the urban Gini index by income source based on CHIP survey data, and find that the contributors are wage (34%) and house subsidies (24%). R. Molero-Simarro (2017) investigate the inequality from the evolution of functional distribution of income and find out the increase of capital income share in top income urban household. Meng (2004) finds that during the marketization of urban sectors, the increase in unemployment led to a fall in urban worker's income and then reduced the inequality in the urban labor market. Shi et al. (2016) investigate the evolution of urban inequality from the angle of wage structure between 1995 and 2013, and find that regional gap and inequality of human capital are major contributors to overall wage inequality. Ma and Li (2016) evaluate the effect of minimum wage on urban inequality from 1993 to 2013 and find that the increase of minimum wages had a positive effect on the wage levels of the low-wage group only from 2007-2013; there was no such effect from 1993 -1995 and from 1998 -2002 . Song (2017 study the household consumption inequality in urban China over 1995 -2013 using 1995 , 2002 and 2013 data. She found that the increase in consumption expenditure per capita increased remarkable after 2002. However, the consumption inequality increases over the period. She also found the inequality of basic food consumption is much smaller than the overall consumption and decreasing steadily. By contrast, clothing consumption inequality is much larger and increasing sharply with the time. The inequality of housing consumption is decreasing and is much larger in the upper half than in the lower half. In addition, the share of food expenditure decreases steadily to 25% as the overall consumption level moving up. The share of clothing in overall consumption remains about 7% over time but exhibits downward sloping. The share of housing consumption sharply increased to 38% in 2013. All those evidences imply the increase in income gap between the poor and the rich.
In this paper, I focus on the income variances across industry sectors instead of the urban-rural gaps. During the globalization, the evolution of inequality, especially the structural change in the labor market, deserves intensive study. First, the urbanization process will continue for a long time in China. The farming activities is no longer an only sector in the rural area. With the investment in less-developed provinces, labor-intensive industries are declining, and the knowledge-intensive industries emerges. The employment structure change will play an important role in the evolution of overall inequality in China. There have been some studies on China's structural change, but few has attempted to bring the shift share for each industry and the evolution of income inequality together. Second, most existing studies focus on explaining the low return to schooling during the economic transition or expanding college access in recent years, but few attentions has been paid to associate the return to schooling with the structural change in employment.
To investigate the structural change effect on income inequality, I use the CHIP data in 1988 and 2013, to make the inequality decomposition and regressions possible. I assume the transition from farming to manufacturing and then to service or high skilled sectors will increase the overall income inequality.
The paper proceeds as follow. Chapter 2 provides some background for the industrial distribution, education and return to education. Chapter 3 introduces the data. Chapter 4 gives the decomposition of variables over time. Chapter 5 is to investigate the determinations of income variances. Chapter 6 summarizes.
CHAPTER 2. SOURCES OF INEQUALITY AND HYPOTHESES

Industrial Distribution
Since the economic reform started in 1978, China has received a large part of international direct investment flows. The introduction of foreign ownership through foreign direct investment (FDI) pushed the economy from collective towards marketization. In 1985, labor mobility across areas was relaxed and local governments were mandated to accept rural migrants into cities as part of their non-agricultural population. In mid-1990s, several policies were made to encourage more high-technology and more capital intensive FDI projects. In 1980, the first four Special Economic Zones (SEZs) were established in Guangdong and Fujian provinces and offered special incentive policies for FDI in these SEZs. The purposes are to attract overseas capital and also as a showcase for the potential impacts of reform.
While FDI in-flows were highly concentrated within these provinces, the amounts remained rather limited (Cheung and Lin, 2004) . After 1984, Hainan Island and fourteen coastal port cities across ten provinces were opened, which were essential to support an export-oriented strategy. The realized value of inward FDI to China reached 3.49 billion dollars in 1990.
Since SEZs and their positive economic impacts were solely a costal endeavor, the expected spillover effects from coastal to inland provinces failed to materialize. In reaction to the widening regional gap, more broadly-based economic reforms and open door policies were pushed forward in the 1990s. In 1992, Deng Xiaoping adopted a new approach which turned away from special regimes toward more nation-wide implementation of open policies. And the decentralization of state control, privatization of the state sector began to accelerate.
Since 1992 inward FDI in China has accelerated and reached the peak level of 45.5 billion dollars in 1998. After a drop due to the Asian crisis, FDI inflows into China surged again, so that "by 2010 China had accumulated FDI stock of 579 billion, well ahead of other large developing and transition economies" (OECD, 2016: p. 10 ). In 1998, all state enterprises, except a few large monopolies, were liquidated and sold to private investors. "China's entry to the WTO in 2001 is likely to deepen China's integration in the international segmentation of production processes and as such should reinforce the FDI attractiveness position of China" (Madariaga, 2007: p. 839 ).
Thus, FDI plays a major role in transforming the Chinese economy. The role of foreign companies is to bring in new production and managerial technologies, together with local labor, to increase capital and improve the overall productivity of the economy. In addition, it creates employment opportunities. "Foreign firms employed around 20 million workers (three percent of China's total employment) at the end of the 1990s" (Madariaga, 2007: p. 840 ). Furthermore, foreign investment enterprises (FIEs) modifies China's industrial structure because FDI incorporates much more equipment and technology knowledge. An important difference in industrial structure between FIEs and domestic firms is that FIEs are relatively more concentrated in the newly developing and fast-growing industries such as information technology and electronic equipment. By contrast, domestic firms are more present in the conventional basic capital-intensive and large-scale industries.
As mentioned above, the direction of FDI is encouraged by exogenous geographical and political factors. The SEZs were attracting more foreign investment enterprises ahead of other regions because of their accessibility to port infrastructures and foreign markets. Hence, I assume that the labor market structural change caused by the economic policies (labor force moving from low-skilled sectors to high-skilled sectors) would cause the income inequality. I would expect the more opened (coastal) provinces had more concentration in manufacturing industries at the beginning of reform and then transit to service sectors. The other regions had more farming activities at the beginning of reform will transit to conventional industry sectors. Overall, the different speed of economic reform across provinces could result in the income inequality.
Human Capital Investment
The geographical dispersion of China's investment in human capital is large. As shown in Table 1 , the proportion of population with more than twelve years schooling (at least some college degree) was 4% in 2000 and had risen to 10% in 2010, this is due to the sharp increase in the enrollment and public funding for college students starting in 1999. The Years), which means only one of two children can get into high school if we assume the compulsory education applied to all children. In 2015 the high school enrollment rate is approximately 58%, which means there are 7% of students don't even graduate from middle school.
The Chinese government and society appear to have failed to keep enough of the country's young people in school during the recent decades of economic growth. The low rate of high school attendance can be attributed to high and rising costs. Academic high school tuition fees in China are not free and are among the highest in the world (Liu et al. 2009 ). College tuition fees also are burdensome for students from poor rural areas and they often do not qualify for need-based financial aid. More importantly, rural families encourage poor exam performance students to drop out from school because of high opportunity cost from staying in school. The parents would suggest their children to find jobs in cities because of increasing demand and wages of low-skills workers in urban area. Another thoughts are related to the poor teaching quality in the rural area. The annual college entrance exam (commonly known as Gaokao) is the only way for entrance into almost all higher education institutions at the undergraduate level. It is usually taken by students in their last year of high school. By the time students are ready to take the exam, most of rural students have dropped out of the system. Since it is based on test scores only, the remaining students in the rural area are not competitive in this exam compared to the urban students. In addition, major cities like Beijing and Shanghai are given higher quotas for admittance to college because the educational resources are not distributed evenly across China. Hence, the rural students are being discriminated in higher education. And that's why they choose to drop out of school. In the short run, drop-out students can gain from migration to cities earlier than other students stay in school. In the long run, as too many people drop out of school too soon and the lowskilled jobs that may have been plentiful, the migrant workers without secondary skills must struggle in the cities. Table 2 shows the schooling gap between urban and rural required by each occupation for the young generation aged 25-35 in 2013 and the average schooling for all individuals in 1988. The education gap between urban residents and rural residents varies between 1.4 to 3.9 years across industries. Only the sectors require higher skills (ie., IT, Financial industry, Education) have slightly less education gap. The last column shows the average schooling in 1988. Since the compulsory education start after 1986, the young generation's average schooling in 2013 can roughly reflect the results of this policy. We could see that the agriculture sectors gain from this policy and the education increased by 3.2 years for rural workers and 5.9 for urban workers compared to the average schooling in 1988.
For other sectors, the improvement in schooling are subtle in rural area. In contrast, the education level in urban areas have increased more than rural area in all sectors, which implies the higher human capital investment in more developed regions. Since we assume a positive relationship between education and wage, I assume the provinces with more percentage of rural residents have lower education level and less developed.
Human capital has a direct role in production through the generation of worker skills. Fleisher and Chen (1996) find the regional inequality of investment in Chinese higher education can explain the high and rising regional income inequality. Hence I assume that the discrepancy of education obtained will result in regional inequality in China. Campos et al. (2016) analyzes the impact of education on income inequality between ethnic minorities and Han in China by using the data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) over the period 1993-2011. They found that there exists significant income inequality to the disadvantage of ethnic minorities but the return to education for ethnic minorities is high, which implies that a portion of the income gap can be overcome with additional education. They found that in general one additional year of education will increase earned incomes of ethnic minorities by 26.3-28% and in particular by 13.5-14.4% for women from an ethnic minority group, by 10.4-14% for ethnic minorities with urban household registration, and by 10.8% for ethnic minorities with rural household registration. Belskaya et al.(2014) evaluates whether the expansion of higher education is economically worthwhile based on a recent surge in the number of campuses and college graduates in Russia. They find that college expansion attracts individuals with lower returns to college, but the returns for marginal students who are directly affected by college expansion vary considerably depending on the scale of expansion and the type of location where new campuses are opened. Marginal individuals in smaller cities and locations without college campuses receive the largest benefits from new campuses.
Return to Schooling
In China, higher education expanded almost six-fold in the decade 1988-2008. J. Knight et al. (2017) shows that the share of higher education graduates in total employment rose by 8 percentage points, but the graduate unemployment rate rose by only 1.4 percentage points. This implies that the higher education wage premium have been depressed by supply shock. Compared to high school leavers, the average hourly wage for the entry cohort of higher education graduates and university graduates fall over the five years. There's the same pattern in the proportion of the "good job" for the entry cohort of higher education graduates and university graduates. In addition, the unemployment rate increased only for these cohorts. Keng, Lin and Orazem (2017) also investigated the expansion of college access and education quality on income inequality in Taiwan. They found that increasing college access alone will not lower inequality, the variance of wage income increased by 7 percent due to the surge of weakly-trained college graduates. As a result, firms substitute more experienced college-trained workers for their less experienced counterparts, leading to falling college premia for young college graduates. Hence, the college-high school wage gaps of young and older workers have moved in polarizing directions.
In this chapter, I will investigate if the structural change can be associated with rising wage premium for higher education. As mentioned above, the employment structures in China are shifting from labor-intensive industries to knowledge-intensive industries. The increasing labor demand of technology and high-skilled sectors during the globalization favor workers with higher education. Meanwhile, the expansion of college access and lower education quality can also reduce the advantages of college graduates. As suggested by Belskaya, the location of workers does make a difference. I assume the provinces with more universities (more college graduates) but lower concentration in higher-skilled industries will have lower wage premium because of the supply shock. To specify the structural change on income across provinces, I will estimate return to schooling using sectors and provinces as income determinants. Working individual aged 18-65 are used as samples. The individual employment rate across industry sectors is used to summarize the density of industries in each province. In addition, the annual income and schooling years for each individual are used to estimate the return to schooling. Hence, the provincial average income is computed by the average annual income for each sector and then summarized by the labor share of sectors. Table 3 Leasing and business services; and Production and Supply of Electricity gas and water, which account for 6% of the labor share. Although it's still far away from other OECD countries, China has higher growth in service sectors (from 26% in 1991 (from 26% in to 45% in 2013 (from 26% in (Word bank, 2017 ).
CHAPTER 4. VARIABLES DECOMPOSITION
Decomposition of Shift Employment Share of Sectors
In the United States, the share of middle skilled jobs (manufacturing, operativesassemblers, secretarial, clerical) decreased by 10% at the same time as the low skilled (local food and personal services) and high skilled jobs (managers, professionals) were increasing during 2002 -2014 (Huffman, 2017 . If China's structural change follow western country's change pattern, the employment in manufacturing sectors will continue to decrease. Highskilled sectors would replace the low-end jobs, the workers with less skills were most likely get laid off and lost the earning power. The modern information technology and software automation have resulted in computerization of routine tasks and rapid displacement of labor in repetitive production and monitoring tasks. For example, online trading platform could replace the traditional bank teller; online shopping and Virtual Reality could reduce the physical stores and the automation could replace the manufacturing workers. Hence, the lowskilled labor force needed by physical retail trading, residential service and banking sectors will be declining. Instead, these conventional industries require more high-skilled managerial workers to control the software or information technology. This also implies the difficulty for migrants from less-developed provinces or from rural originally participating in lower-skilled job to move to higher-skilled job in cities. Hence, the workers need to be upskilled to adapt themselves to the new environment.
Next, I will decompose the shift share into two parts:
Where is the proportion of all employment in province .
is the proportion of employment in sector in province .
is the proportion of employment in sector in total employment.
are the proportion of all country employment in sector j, where ∑ =1 = 1 .
The first term (within term) is the change in sector share due to growing share of this sector in employment within provinces, holding relative provincial demand for labor fixed (ie, individual provinces have increased their demand for this sector compared to other provinces, even if they did not change their overall share of the workforce).
The second term (between term) is the change in shares due to changes in employment between provinces, holding the mix of sectors within each province fixed (ie, sector share rises because provinces that hire this sector are growing). Table 4 displays the shift share results. The changes in share across sectors are mainly due to the within-term changes (decrease by 17%). On average, the weighted average labor share of goods-producing industries decreased by 25% but the service-producing industries increased by 8%. Hence, we can conclude that the structural transition is from primary industry to secondary and tertiary industries.
Bai and Qian (2010) 
Decomposition of Change in Income across Provinces
The decomposition model displays as follows:
Where is the average income in province .
is the average income in sector in province .
ℎ is the proportion of employment in sector in province .
are the proportion of all country employment in province p, where ∑ =1 = 1 .
The first term (within term) is the change in average income due to raised income level within this sector, holding relative sectoral demand for labor fixed (ie, individual sectors have increased their remuneration for employees compared to other sectors, even if they did not change their overall share of the workforce).
The second term (between term) is the change in average income due to changes in employment shares between sectors, holding the mix of wage within each sector fixed (ie, income rises because sectors that offer higher remuneration are growing). 89% of the income increase in China are due to the within-term changes. Due to the increased labor productivity and technology improvement after economic reform, the companies are willing to offer higher remunerations. The shift share can also contribute to 11% of the income increase. The employees in Chongqin and Sichuan are more likely to be affected by the sector change. Or we can say the provinces with more farming to nonfarming transition have higher between term effects. From the province perspective, most provinces have the income growth more than 3. Only Liaoning, Guangdong, Sichuan and Yunnan provinces have income growth less than 3. Among these provinces, Yunnan (2.41) has the lowest income growth and Jiangsu (3.37) has the highest income growth.
Decomposition of Change in Average Schooling across Provinces
Where is the average schooling in province .
is the average schooling in sector in province .
The first term (within term) is the change in average education due to raised requirement for education level within this sector, holding relative sectoral demand for labor fixed (ie, individual sectors have increased their demand for higher educated employees compared to other sectors, even if they did not change their overall share of the workforce).
The second term (between term) is the change in average education due to changes in employment shares between sectors, holding the mix of skills within each sector fixed (ie, education rises because sectors that hire higher educated employees are growing). and Gansu are more likely to be affected by the higher skills requirements within sectors.
Among these provinces, Shanxi (0.27 years) has the lowest education improvement and Chongqin (4.08 years) has the highest education improvement. However, the average income improved by 3.03 in Shanxi and 3.04 in Chongqin, which means the return to schooling are quite different across provinces. 
CHAPTER 5. VARANCE DECOMPOSITION APPROACH
We are interested in monitoring how the changing shares of industry sectors composition contribute to the income inequality. p. The first term shows how much of the variance is due to inequality within sectors while the second term denotes how much of the income variance is due to inequality between sectors. The country-level variance 2 is the weighted average using employment proportion as weights: . 
Sector share Method: To demonstrate the share change effect, we construct the counterfactual income variance by altering the sector employment share to be in 2013.
That is, change 1988 to be 2013 in equation (c).
From Table 7 found that the increased return to schooling and shift share from agricultural sectors to other sectors can mainly contribute to the increase in inequality. 
